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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
GEORGE STEVEN CONDIE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
Case No. 16646

vs.
DR. ROBERT L. YOUNGBLOOD,
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APPELLANT'S BRIEF
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defendant's Motion to Dismiss and remand with instructions for the
defendant to file a responsive pleading to plaintiff's Complaint.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff was injured in a motorcycle accident on August
7, 1974.

He was hospitalized with the defendant and another doctor

as treating physicians.

During the course of the treatment, decub-

itus ulcers were developed by the plaintiff.

Plaintiff continued

after his release to be treated by defendant and continued having
problems with the decubitus ulcers.

In September, 1975, plaintiff

was hospitalized by the defendant, and during the course of said
hospitalization, it was discovered that plaintiff had developed
osteomyelitis.

Two years later as a result of the osteomyelitis,

the plaintiff had his right leg amputated.
Plaintiff filed suit against the hospital and later
against this defendant for the negligent diagnosis and treatment.
Suit was filed against the hospital in October, 1975 and against
this defendant on September 15, 1977.

In the summer of 1978, the

lawsuit was settled as against the hospital.

Summons for

thepres~t

Complaint was placed in the hands of the process server within thre
months of its filing.

(See Affidavit of Don Hammill)

Summons and

Complaint were subsequently served on this defendant on September
14, 1978.
Plaintiff had been represented by two attorneys, who
shortly after the service of the Summons and Complaint, had both
withdrawn as counsel by sending notice to the Court, counsel for
the defendant and plaintiff.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-2-

On January 12, 1979, respondent's attorney mailed to
the appellant a notice requiring the appellant to appoint another
attorney or to appear in person.

Appellant received this notice

and was in the process of contacting other lawyers.

On February

1, 1979, respondent's attorney mailed a Notice of Hearing regarding his Motion to Dismiss to the appellant at the address listed
on the Complaint and Sununons.
mailed to any other person.

No other notice of said Motion was
The appellant never received, nor

did appellant have knowledge of said Notice, nor of the hearing
date. (See Affidavit of Appellant)
return receipt requested.

Said Notice was sent, certified,

The return was signed by an individual

not the plaintiff. (See exhibit attached to Affidavit of respondent's
attorney)
On February 13, 1979, hearing was held on respondent's
Motion to Quash and/or Dismiss.

Respondent appeared through counsel,

and appellant neither appeared in person nor through counsel.
said hearing, the Judgment of Dismissal was granted.

At

Counsel for

the respondent then mailed a copy of the Judgment to the appellant,
not by certified mail, but the appellant never received nor had
notice of said entry of Judgment.
Appellant then obtained the services of his present
attorney who, upon reading the Court file, discovered the Judgment
of Dismissal and informed appellant of the same and moved to set
aside the Judgment of Dismissal and filed supporting Affidavits
signed by the appellant.

Hearing was held on said Motion, and the

Motion was denied by Judge Wilkinson by Order signed and dated
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timely filed on August 27, 1979.
ARGUMENT
POINT I:

THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
IN DENYING THE APPELLANT'S MOTION TO SET
ASIDE THE JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL.

Appellant urges three reasons why it was an abuse of
discretion for the District Court to refuse to set aside the Judg·
ment of Dismissal:
1.

That the appellant never had notice of the hearing.

2.

That the notice was improper.

3.

That the defendant was not entitled to his Judgment

of Dismissal.
The question of whether or not to grant relief or to
otherwise set aside a Judgment, is largely a matter of discretion
for the Trial Court.

However, such discretion is not unbounded,

and there is a policy in the law that disfavors the granting of
Default Judgments.

As stated in Mayhew v. Standard Gilsonite

Compqny, 376 P.2d 951 at Page 952:
"It is undoubtedly correct that the trial court is
endowed with considerable latitude of discretion in granting or denying slx:h rotions. However, it is also true

that the court cannot act arbitrarily in that regard, but
sOOul.d be generally indulgent toward pennitting full inquiry and knCMledge of disputes so they can be settled
advisedly and in conformity with law and justice. To
claltp a judgnent ridigly and irrevocably on a party
without a hearing is obviously a hard and oppressive
thing. It is fundanental in our systan of justice that
each party to a controversy should be afforded an opportunity to present his side of the case. For that reason
it is quite uniformly regarded as an abuse of discretion
to refuse to vacate a default judgment \\here there is
reasonable justification or excuse for the defendant's
failure to appear, and tirrely application is made to set
it aside."
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These principles have been continued to be upheld by this Court.
Cf. Heath v. Mower, 597 F.2d 855 (Utah, 1979).
In the case at bar, plaintiff has tendered a reasonable
excuse of his non-appearance and failure to attend the hearing.
As stated in his Affidavit, he was, during this period of time,
attempting to obtain new counsel; that the address the notice
was mailed to was that of his estranged wife; that in the month
of January, he was not residing at the address, and that du.ring
February, he was hospitalized.

It is also his sworn statement

that he never received notice of the hearing.

Further, defendant's

attempt to insure personal receipt of the notice by certified mail
rendered a receipt of the notice by some other individual than the
plaintiff.
The statutes of the State of Utah have addressed themselves to the problems and procedures of withdrawal and substitution
of counsel and proceedings after notice of withdrawal.

As stated

in 1953, U.C.A., §78-51-35, it states:
"When an attorney is changed as provided in the next
preceding section [filing notice of witMrawal with the
court), written notice of the change and substitution of
a new attorney or of the appearance of the party in person
ITUlSt be given to the adverse party; until then he ITUlSt
recognize the fonner attorney."
It would appear that the above quoted section was passed
in order to protect litigants of what transpired here.

The statute

dictates that until such time as the opposing litigant obtains a
new attorney and the court and parties are advised of that fact,
or that he enters his appearance pro se indicating his willingness
to represent
himself,
his
opponents
and
attorney
must
stilland
recognize
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the former attorney as counsel of record and thus provide him with
notice of any and all motions and hearings.

This would insure that

notice would be actually received and responded to and help enable
the litigant whose attorney has withdrawn to state his need for
more time or his position.
Although not dispositive, the Trial Court should look
to the proposed defense or claim of the individual to determine
if there is just cause for the setting aside of the Default Judgment.

This was recognized in Mason v. Mason, 597 P.2d 1322 at

Page 1323:

"'lbmefore, notwithstanding the rule of liberality
in granting notions to set aside judgments in appropriate circumstances, that should not be done unless
tbe m:wing party tenders the defense of sufficient irerit
to justify that procedure. This leads us to a oonsideraticn of the principal issue in this case: whether
the defendant did tender a ireritorious defense."
This issue is discussed in the following second point.
It is there contended that as a matter of law, the defendant was
not entitled to a Judgment of Dismissal, and that as a matter of
law, those defenses should have been overruled.

Such point is

appropriate to this argument in that the plaintiff does have a
meritorious response to the Motion to Dismiss of the defendant.
POINT II:

THAT AS A MATTER OF LAW, THE DEFENDANT
WAS NOT ENTITLED TO THE JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL UPON THE GROUNDS URGED BY THE
DEFENDANT.

The defendant in his Motion to Quash and/or Dismiss the
plaintiff's Complaint, asserted four grounds which will be treated
serially in this argument.

Those grounds were:

(1) improper servi
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limitations, (3) failure to allege compliance with the Utah Health
Care Malpractice Act, and (4) failure to obtain an attorney pursuant to local Court rules.
Defendant's first ground for dismissal was that the
summons and Complaint were not served in compliance with Rule
4 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

This rule requires that

Summons must issue upon a Complaint within three months from the
date of filing of the Complaint, and that the Summons must, in
any event, be served within one year after the filing of the
Complaint, or the action will be dismissed.

Affidavits were

submitted prior to the hearing on the Motion to Dismiss which
stated that the Summons and Complaint had been placed in the hands
of a process server within three months of filing (See Affidavit
of Don Hammill).

Further the Affidavit of service recites that

the Summons and Complaint were served on September 14, 1978 within
one year of the filing of the Complaint.

Thus, it would appear

the service complied with the rules.
There was some argument made by counsel for the defendant
at the hearing on the Motion to Set Aside Judgment that the Summons
and Complaint served on the defendant were different than the
Summons and complaint which were filed initially.

However, there

is no evidence that in the material allegations or the prayer of
the complaint that there was any difference between the Complaints.
Further,the rules provide, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 4(h),
that process or proof of service thereof may be amended unless it
appears prejudicial.

There being no material difference in the
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to the defendant which would affect his substantial rights.
The second defense asserted by the defendant was that
the action is barred by the statute of limitations.

This defense

is a factual defense based upon the circumstances of each individua;
case.

The applicable statute containing the statute of limitations

at the time of the acts complained of, was contained in 19 5 3, U. C.A.
§78-12-28 and allowed for a two year statute of limitations.

This

statute of limitations had been construed to mean that the statute
of limitations does not begin to run until the plaintiff knew, or
should have known, of the cause of action.
436 P.2d 435 (Utah, 1969).

Christiansen v. Rees,

Further, for any period of time the

defendant is without the State of Utah, such period of time is
not part of the time period for computation of the statute of
limitations. 1953, U.C.A. §78-12-35.
The statute of limitations is an affirmative defense-one to be pleaded and proved by the defendant.
a factual hearing and decision.

It also requires

In this case, there is an allegati~

of continuing negligence on the part of the defendant, and thus,
the commencement period would be a question of fact.
absence by the defendant would toll the statute.

Also, any

At the hearing,

it was argued by counsel for the defendant that the statute of
limitations began to run on September 6, 1975, the day the plaintifl
entered the hospital, and that thus, the Complaint was filed nine
days too late.

Plaintiff objects to the unsupported conclusion

that September 6, 1975 was the day the statute commenced to run,
and further believes that evidence would demonstrate an absence of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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1

Thus, it is the position of the plaintiff that dismissal
based upon the state of the pleadings and the lack of evidence
before the Court makes dismissal on the grounds of being barred
by the statute of limitations improper at this time.
The third defense raised is the failure to allege compliance
with the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act.

It is the position of

the plaintiff that the provisions of the Utah Health Care Malpractice
Act do not apply to this case.
The actions of the defendant and injuries occurred are
alleged to have happened during and prior to 1975.

The Utah Health

Care Malpractice Act became effective 60 days after adjournment
of the Utah State Legislature on January 31, 1976.
did not apply tothis injury and cause of action.

As such, it
The defendant's

concern is that the plaintiff did not file a Notice of Intention
to Commence an Action, pursuant to the provisions of §78-14-8.

The

Act in its own terms would indicate that this section is not to be
applied retroactively.

The last section of the Act, §78-14-11 states:

"The provisions of this act, with the exception
of the provisions relating to the limitation on the
time for camencing an action, shall not apply to
injuries, death or services rendered which occurred
prior to the effective date of this act."

The limitation period set forth in the Health Care Malpractice Act
is in section 78-14-4.
In

~ealey

v. Clegg, 579 P.2d 919 (Utah, 1978), this

Court upheld the dismissal of a malpractice action for failure to
give the required 90 day notice.

Also in that case, the cause of

action arose prior to the effective date of this Act.

It is urged

by this
plaintiff
that
that
case
failedprovided
to take
into ofaccount
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11 of the Health Care Malpractice Act and failed to adequately
ascertain the legislative intent with regard to the retroactivity
of the statute.
As mentioned previously, that last section of the Act
provides that the Act shall not be retroactive, except for the two
year period of limitations for filing an action.

After the decisior

in the Vealey case, the legislature amended Section 8 of the Health
Care Malpractice Act by adding an an additional paragraph which
stated:
"This sectian shall, for purposes of detennining its
retroactivity, not be oonstrued as relating to the
Umitation on time for cx:mrencing any action, and shall
apply only to causes of action arising on or after April
1, 1976."
Thus, the Utah Legislature overruled the decision in
Vealey in a manner expressing that the legislative intent always
was the notice of intention to commence the action does not bear
upon the limitation of time in commencing an action, and thus,
pursuant to the final section of the Act, is not to be held to be
retroactive.
The last ground for dismissal alleged by the defendant
was failure to obtain an attorney, pursuant to local Court rules
and notice requiring appointment.

This, by itself, is not sufficieni

to allow dismissal and survive a Motion to Set Aside Judgment.

In

Utah Oil Company v. Harris, 565 P.2d 1135 (Utah, 1977), the case
was dismissed at the Trial court level with prejudice for plaintiff'
failure to appoint a new attorney and failure to diligently prosecut
The Supreme Court there reversed the dismissal.
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In Utah Oil, supra, in arriving at the decision, the
Court first quoted, 1953, U.C.A., §78-51-36, Notice to appoint
successor,

The Court then stated at Page 1136:
"The foregoing clearly appears to have been enacted
to safeguard a litigant who finds himself without counsel
and prevents further proceedings until he again has counsel
or chcx:>ses to proceed pro se. It is not a 'court' directive
nor does it exact a:ey penalty against the litigant who fails
for one reason or another to engage new counsel since, by
its own te?lns, it affords him the 'altexnative' of appearing in person. Consequently, 1'hlen a litigant does fail to
engage new oounsel, that, in and of itself, is not an adequate
basis to default him or to disniss as against him with prejudice."

Local Court rule 2.5 also tracts the statute that is
set forth in the discussion under Point I and states:

"When an attomey dies or is rerroved or suspended or
withdraws fran the case or ceases to act as an attomey,
the party to an action for whan such attomey was acting,
must before any further proceedings are had against him,
be required by the adverse party, by written notice to
appoint another attomey or to appear in person."
The thrust of the rule would appear to require either
the appointment of another attorney or an appearance pro se before
further hearings can be had.

This, of course, would include the

hearing here in question when the plaintiff did not appear, either
personally or through counsel and Judgment was granted against him.
CONCLUSION
The state of the record, therefore, clearly demonstrates
that it was an abuse of discretion by the Trial Court to not set
aside the Judgment of Dismissal entered against the plaintiff.

This,

because of the timely application of the plaintiff after learning of
the entry of the Order of Dismissal and the reasonable grounds and
excuses which he gave for his failure to appear and defend the Motion
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Court, at a minimum for the Order of Dismissal to be set aside,
and the plaintiff be granted an opportunity to fully answer and
respond to the grounds alleged for dismissal.
It is also urged by the plaintiff-appellant that based
upon the state of the record, it is clear that the defendant, as
a matter of law, is not entitled to a Judgment of Dismissal of
plaintiff's cause of action.

Further, it is the position of the

plaintiff that as a matter of law, the defendant's grounds for
dismissal be overruled and found against him with prejudice.
Respectfully submitted this

day of November, 1979.

ROBERTS, BLACK & DIBBLEE

By

=T~h-o-m---=D~.---.R~o~bre~r~t-s~~~~~~~~~

Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant
400 Ten Broadway Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF to Mr. David

w.

Slage, Attorney

for Defendant, 700 Continental Bank Building, Salt Lake City, Utah
84101, this

day of November, 1979.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered
by the Utah State Library.
-12Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

